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CLD-270       NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-2682 
 ___________ 
 
 LAWRENCE KEMP TENNILLE, 




FRANCISCO J. QUINTANA, EX-WARDEN; ROD SMITH, HEALTH SERVICES 
ADMINISTRATOR; S.L. NOLAN, ASSOCIATE WARDEN; STEPHEN D. GAGNON, 
ASSOCIATE WARDEN; DENISE A. HALE, EMPLOYEE SERVICE MANAGER 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 09-cv-00238) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Sean J. McLaughlin 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
 or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
August 18, 2011 
 Before:  RENDELL, FUENTES and SMITH, Circuit Judges 
 







 Lawrence Kemp Tennille, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from an 
order of the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, motion for summary 
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judgment.  Upon consideration of the record, we conclude that the appeal does not 
present a substantial question.  Therefore, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s 
judgment.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.  
  In September 2009, Tennille filed a complaint, which he later amended, alleging 
that prison officials at FCI-McKean denied his requests to have prescription eyeglasses 
mailed to him from the manufacturer after they were purchased by his family at a cost of 
$250.
1
  Tennille asserted that the actions of the prison officials constituted a conspiracy to 
retaliate against him for filing a civil complaint and violated his rights to due process and 
equal protection.  The defendants filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for 
summary judgment, arguing that Tennille failed to exhaust his administrative remedies 
and, in any event, failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.  The matter 
was referred to a Magistrate Judge, who recommended that summary judgment be 
entered in favor of the defendants based on Tennille’s failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies.  In particular, the Magistrate Judge concluded that, although Tennille had fully 
pursued administrative remedies with respect to an allegation that the denial of eyeglasses 
violated prison policies, he failed to raise due process, equal protection, conspiracy, and 
retaliation claims in the administrative remedy process.
2
  Over Tennille’s objections, the 
District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, and entered 
                                                 
1
 The Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) did provide Tennille with new prescription eyeglasses free of 
charge through its UNICOR program. 
 
2
 The Magistrate Judge noted that, to the extent Tennille’s exhausted grievance could be 
construed to include a due process claim, such a claim failed because a violation of prison 
regulations in itself is not a constitutional violation.  See Phillips v. Norris, 320 F.3d 844, 847 




judgment in favor of the defendants.  After the District Court denied Tennille’s motion 
for reconsideration, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), Tennille appealed. 
 We exercise plenary review over an order granting a motion for summary 
judgment.  Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217, 221 (3d Cir. 1998).  A grant of 
summary judgment will be affirmed if our review reveals that “there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (amended Dec. 1, 2010).  “We review the facts in the light most 
favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was entered.”  Coolspring Stone 
Supply, Inc. v. Am. States Life Ins. Co., 10 F.3d 144, 146 (3d Cir. 1993).  We can affirm 
the judgment of the District Court on any basis supported by the record.  Brown v. Pa. 
Dep’t of Health Emergency Med. Servs., 318 F.3d 473, 475 n.1 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 Initially, we conclude that the Magistrate Judge erred in holding that Tennille 
failed to exhaust administrative remedies.  The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
(“PLRA”) prohibits an inmate from bringing a civil rights suit alleging specific acts of 
unconstitutional conduct by prison officials until the inmate has exhausted available 
administrative remedies.  42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2001).   The PLRA requires “proper” 
exhaustion, meaning that the inmate must follow the procedural requirements of the 
prison grievance system.  Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218 228, 231 (3d Cir. 2004).  The 
BOP has established a multi-tier administrative remedy procedure, which requires that an 
inmate, after attempting to resolve an issue informally, file a formal Administrative 
Remedy Request on an appropriate form.  28 C.F.R. §§ 542.13(a); 542.14.  If the inmate 
is dissatisfied with the prison’s response, the inmate may pursue appeals to the Regional 
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Director and, ultimately, to the General Counsel.  28 C.F.R. § 542.15(a).  In this case, 
Tennille followed the proper procedures, complaining at each level about the denial of his 
request to have prescription eyeglasses sent to him from the manufacturer.     
As the defendants acknowledged, “there is no dispute that [Tennille] exhausted his 
available administrative remedies with respect to his claim that denying his request to 
have eyeglasses sent to him violated prison policy.”  Although Tennille’s administrative 
grievances did not cite the specific constitutional grounds on which his complaint is 
based, we conclude that he properly exhausted his administrative remedies.  Nyhuis v. 
Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 77-78 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating that “[c]ompliance with the 
administrative remedy scheme will be satisfactory if it is substantial.”); see also Jones v. 
Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 219 (2007) (noting that “the primary purpose of a grievance is to 
alert prison officials to a problem, not to provide personal notice to a particular official 
that he may be sued.” (quoting Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 522 (5th Cir. 2004))). 
 Nevertheless, Tennille’s due process, equal protection, retaliation, and conspiracy 
claims fail on their merits.
3
  When reviewing these claims, we accept as true all of the 
allegations contained in the complaint and draw reasonable inferences in favor of 
Tennille.  See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007) (per curiam).  To survive 
dismissal, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state 
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 
(2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 
                                                 
3
   We note that the defendants addressed the merits of these claims in their motion to dismiss or, 




 Deprivation of inmate property by prison officials does not state a cognizable due 
process claim if the prisoner has an adequate post-deprivation state remedy.  Hudson v. 
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984).  Here, adequate remedies were available to Tennille, 
who sought relief through the administrative remedy process.   Tillman v. Lebanon 
County Corr., 221 F.3d 410, 422 (3d Cir. 2000).  Furthermore, Tennille did not state an 
equal protection claim, as he failed to allege that the defendants permitted eyeglasses to 
be sent to other similarly situated inmates.  Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 
239 (3d Cir. 2006) (stating that plaintiff’s “claim must fail because he does not allege the 
existence of similarly situated individuals”).  We also reject Tennille’s unsupported claim 
that the defendants refused his request for privately purchased eyeglasses in retaliation 
for filing a lawsuit against mailroom staff.  This claim falters insofar as Tennille failed to 
rebut record evidence indicating that the defendants denied his request because the value 
of the eyeglasses exceeded the amount authorized by an internal prison regulation.  See 
Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 334 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that “once a prisoner 
demonstrates that his exercise of a constitutional right was a substantial or motivating 
factor in the challenged decision, the prison officials may still prevail by proving that 
they would have made the same decision absent the protected conduct for reasons 
reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest”); cf. Maberry v. McKune, 24 F. 
Supp. 2d 1222, 1228-29 (D. Kan. 1998) (holding that regulation which imposed quantity 
and value limitations on property which inmates were allowed to possess did not violate 
equal protection or due process rights).  Finally, Tennille’s conclusory and unsupported 
allegations of a conspiracy are insufficient to state a claim.  D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area 
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Vocational Tech. Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1377 (3d Cir. 1992) (agreeing that “plaintiffs 
failed to assert any facts from which any type of conspiratorial agreement . . . can be 
inferred.”).  There is no indication that Tennille could amend his complaint so as to 
survive dismissal for failure to state a claim. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that no substantial question is presented by 
this appeal.  See I.O.P. 10.6. Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s 
judgment. 
 
 
 
